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Abstract
In this short review I present my personal reflections on QBism.
I have no intrinsic sympathy neither to QBism nor to subjective in-
terpretation of probability in general. However, I have been following
development of QBism from its very beginning, observing its evolution
and success, sometimes with big surprise. Therefore my reflections
on QBism can be treated as “external observer” reflections. I hope
that my view on this interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) has
some degree of objectivity. It may be useful for researchers who are
interested in quantum foundations, but do not belong to the QBism-
community, because I tried to analyze essentials of QBism critically
(i.e., not just emphasizing its advantages, as in a typical QBist pub-
lication). QBists, too, may be interested in comments of an external
observer who monitored development of this approach to QM during
the last 16 years. The second part of the paper is devoted to in-
terpretations of probability, objective versus subjective, and views of
Kolmogorov, von Mises, and de Finetti. Finally, de Finetti’s approach
to methodology of science is presented and compared with QBism.
1 Introduction
As is well known, QM which manifests huge success in the mathematical
representation of the basic problems of physics of the micro-world, suffers
heavily of diversity of interpretations of this mathematical representation.
QBism is one of the most recent attempts to provide a consistent interpre-
tation of QM, free of all possible mysteries and paradoxes. In this short
review I present my personal reflections on QBism. The papers starts with
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a historical remark on the first years of QBism. It continues with brief rep-
resentation of its essentials, mainly referring to and citing its creators. Then
the main postulates of QBism are critically analyzed. We emphasize that the
cornerstone of QBism is the interpretation of QM as a machine for update of
probabilities based on a modification of the classical formula of total prob-
ability (FTP). QBism version of FTP is derived with the aid of symmetric
informationally complete positive operator valued measures (SIC-POVMs).1
The rest of the paper is devoted to interpretations of probability. Here
diversity is not so huge as in QM, but the gap between two main interpreta-
tions, objective and subjective, is no smaller than the gap between two basic
trends in interpretations of QM, realist (in the spirit of Einstein) and non-
realist (in the spirit of Copenhagen). We present the original Kolmogorov
interpretation of probability [41, 42, 43] (which is not so well known, even
in the probability community) and compare it with the genuine frequency
interpretation of von Mises [56, 57, 58] and subjective interpretation of de
Finetti [17], [16].
Then, following de Finetti, we point out that consistent appealing to
the subjective interpretation of probability should lead to reconsideration
of the objective treatment of the scientific methodology. Finally we point
that de Finetti was even more revolutionary than QBists, because his sub-
jective treatment of scientific method was not restricted to “special quantum
world”. In some way QBists made one good turn but refrain from another,
they revolutionary declared the private agent (user) perspective to knowl-
edge about “quantum world”, but they were not brave enough to follow de
Finetty completely, i.e., to declare the private agent perspective for knowl-
edge about classical world as well. The latter is an exciting project still
waiting its realization.
2 QBism childhood in Va¨xjo¨
In 2001 QBism was strongly represented at the second Va¨xjo¨ conference on
quantum foundations, “Quantum Theory: Reconsideration of Foundations”
(QTFT2001), June 17-21, 2001. We (organizers and participants of this
conference) strongly believed that the quantum information revolution would
soon lead to great foundational revolution. Unfortunately, dreams did not
1 From this viewpoint, i.e., QM as a probability update machine, QBism is similar to
the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation of QM. The latter is a realist contextual statistical interpretation,
so ideologically it is opposite to QBism. However, the probability update basis makes it
close to QBism. At the same time, even this closeness is only formal, since the QBism
version of generalized FTP differs crucially from the Va¨xjo¨ version.
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come true. Nevertheless, the energy of the quantum information revolution
was transformed in a series of stormy debates during the series of the Va¨xjo¨
conferences, 2000-2015. Although these debates did not lead to a complete
resolution of the basic problems of quantum mechanics, they clarified some
of these problems, especially the problem of the interpretation of a quantum
state. QBism was definitely one of the main foundational outputs of the
quantum information revolution. 2
As the organizers of QTFT-2001, I and C. Fuchs both dreamed for cre-
ation of a consistent and clear interpretation of QM, free of mysteries and
paradoxes. However, we went in two opposite directions. I followed Einstein
and later, as the result of better understanding of Bohr’s writings (and espe-
cially comments of A. Plotnitsky on them), tried to unify Einstein’s realist
statistical interpretation with Bohr’s contextual interpretation by filtering
out Bohr’s nonrealist attitude, see [33, 34, 38] for so called Va¨xjo¨ interpreta-
tion of QM. Both Einstein and Bohr (as well as, e.g., von Neumann) used the
statistical (ensemble) interpretation of quantum probabilities. Therefore the
Va¨xjo¨ interpretation is based on this statistical interpretation. It also was
important that as student I was strongly influenced by A. N. Kolmogorov
and B. V. Gnedenko who always emphasized that probability is objective and
statistical. Later, after PhD, I discovered works of von Mises [56, 57, 58]. I
really enjoyed this reading! Von Mises’ interpretation of probability differs
from Kolmogorov’s interpretation. Nevertheless, Misesian probability is also
objective and statistical . In any event, nobody of them (Einstein, Bohr,
von Neumann, Kolmogorov, Gnedenko) and neither I would agree with De
Finetti’s slogan: “Probability does not exist!” and with his subjective inter-
pretation of probability. My views on interpretation of quantum states and
probabilities were presented in [33].
C. Fuchs went in the opposite direction, he (with support of C. M. Caves,
R. Schack, and D. Mermin) openly, loudly, and proudly declared [10], [11],
[20]- [24] that QM is only about knowledge (and here QBists are very close to
the fathers of the Copenhagen interpretation, N. Bohr, and W. Heisenberg).
But this widely supported viewpoint was completed with very strained and
revolutionary declaration that this quantum knowledge has to be treated
as personal knowledge. Subjective interpretation of quantum probability
matches perfectly such a private agent perspective of quantum theory. QBists
2Besides QBism, we can mention the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation of QM (statistical realist and
contextual) [33], [34] derivation of the QM-formalism from simple operational principles, D’
Ariano [14], [15] and Chiribella et al. [12], [13] (first time this project was also announced
in Va¨xjo¨), and the statistical Copenhagen interpretation (statistical non-realist) which final
formulation was presented at the Va¨xjo¨-15 conference by A. Plotnitsky and based on his
previous studies about the probabilistic structure of QM [47]–[50].
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emphasize the Bayesian probability update and decision making structure of
the quantum probability calculus.
From my viewpoint, the latter is one of the main contributions of QBism
in clarification of quantum foundations. Independently this viewpoint was
presented in the framework of the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation, section [33, 34, 38].
At the beginning I and C. Fuchs did not recognize this similarity, namely,
interpretation of the calculus of quantum probabilities as a machinery for
update of probabilities. And it is clear why: at that time I emphasized
realism and objectivity and C. Fuchs privacy and subjectivity. And the
probability update dimension was shadowed by these philosophic issues. This
explains the appearance of Fuch’s anti-Va¨xjo¨ paper [19].
Nevertheless, intuitively I felt sympathy to QBism but roots of this sym-
pathy were not clear for me.3 At the Va¨xjo¨-15 conference QBism was widely
represented and celebrated its world-wide recognition. Nobel Prize Laure-
ate T. Ha¨nsch presented the great lecture about QBism as the only possible
consistent foundational basis of quantum information theory. This lecture
ignited the stormy debate and T. Ha¨nsch and C. Fuchs were attacked by the
realist opposition (leaded by L. Vaidman and A. Elitzur).
3 Quantum theory is about evaluation of ex-
pectations for the content of personal ex-
perience
In contrast to von Neumann, Fuchs proposed to interpret probability in the
subjective way. To present essentials of some theory, sometimes it is practical
simply to cite works of its creators (this is definitely not the case of Bohr, or
von Neumann, or even myself). Here we cite C. Fuchs and R. Schack [23],
pp. 3-4:
“The fundamental primitive of QBism is the concept of experience. According
to QBism, quantum mechanics is a theory that any agent can use to evaluate her
expectations for the content of her personal experience.
QBism adopts the personalist Bayesian probability theory pioneered by Ram-
sey [52] and de Finetti [17] and put in modern form by Savage [53] and Bernardo
and Smith [1] among others. This means that QBism interprets all probabilities,
in particular those that occur in quantum mechanics, as an agent’s personal, sub-
3Once Christopher Fuchs asked me: “Why did you support QBism so strongly during
the Va¨xjo¨-series of conferences? QBism contradicts your own Va¨xjo¨ interpretation!” In
fact, I was not able to explain this even for myself. I had a feeling that QBIsm can be
useful. But how? and where?
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jective degrees of belief. This includes the case of certainty - even probabilities 0
or 1 are degrees of belief. ...
In QBism, a measurement is an action an agent takes to elicit an experience.
The measurement outcome is the experience so elicited. The measurement outcome
is thus personal to the agent who takes the measurement action. In this sense,
quantum mechanics, like probability theory, is a single user theory. A measurement
does not reveal a pre-existing value. Rather, the measurement outcome is created
in the measurement action.
According to QBism, quantum mechanics can be applied to any physical sys-
tem. QBism treats all physical systems in the same way, including atoms, beam
splitters, Stern-Gerlach magnets, preparation devices, measurement apparatuses,
all the way to living beings and other agents. In this, QBism differs crucially from
various versions of the Copenhagen interpretation. ...
An agent’s beliefs and experiences are necessarily local to that agent. This
implies that the question of nonlocality simply does not arise in QBism.”
We shall revisit the interpretational issues of QBism after the presentation
of its basic probabilistic principle in the next session.
4 QBism as a probability update machinery
The previous section might create the impression that the subjective interpre-
tation of quantum probabilities is the key point of QBism. It might be that
even its creators have the same picture of their theory. For me, the essence of
QBism is neither this very special interpretation of quantum probabilities nor
the concrete agent perspective of QM. For me, the main ideological invention
of C. Fuchs and R. Schack was treatment of the mathematical formalism of
QM as a generalization of the classical Bayesian machinery of the probability
update. This viewpoint clarifies the meaning of the basic rule of QM – the
Born rule as a complex Hilbert space representation of generalization of the
classical formula of total probability (FTP).
This dimension of QBism is identical to the probability update dimension
of the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation [33, 34, 38]. There are a few differences.
One is the difference in the interpretations of probability. However, nowa-
days I do not consider it as the crucial difference (in contrast to my first
debates with C. Fuchs in 2001-2003, [33] and [19]). Really, in a long series of
updates the subjective and statistical viewpoints coincide. 4
4 In the mentioned debates I also was strongly against the anti-realist attitude of
QBism. However, now this attitude does not disturb me so much as 12 year ago. Either
I started to understand QBists views on the problem of realism better or QBists changed
their views (or both). QBism needs not appeal to any subquantum model providing the
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For me, the main difference between QBism and the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation
is in the mathematics, not in physics or in philosophy. Both the Va¨xjo¨
interpretation of QM [31], [32], [38] and QBism [21]-[24] the Born rule is
treated as generalization of classical formula of total probability (FTP) in the
language of linear operators. However, these interpretations are based on
two totally different mathematical generalizations of FTP - both matching
the Born rule.
Starting with the Born rule, QBists derived their special version of gener-
alized FTP which is based on a very special class of the quantum probability
updates, based on atomic instruments with SIC-POVMs, see appendix.
We now briefly present the QBism scheme for the probability update,
namely, the representation of the Born rule as a generalization of FTP; here
we again follow Fuchs and Schack [21]-[23].5
Quantum states are represented by density operators ρ in a Hilbert space
assumed to be finite dimensional. A measurement (an action taken by the
agent) is described by a POVM F = (Fj), where j labels the potential
outcomes experienced by the agent. The agent’s personalist probability6
p(Fj) of experiencing outcome j is given by the Born rule:
p(Fj) = TrFjρ. (1)
Similar to the probabilities on the left-hand side of the Born rule, QBism
regards the operators ρ and Fj on the right-hand side as judgments made by
the agent, representing her personalist degrees of belief.
The Born rule as written in Eq. (1) appears to connect probabilities on
the left-hand side of the equation with other kinds of mathematical objects
- operators - on the right hand side.
ontic description of quantum systems and processes, in particular, to hidden variables.
Nor is QBism concerned with struggle against such models. It seems that the personal
position of C. Fuchs is similar to the position of N. Bohr: for quantum physics, it plays
no role whether finally one would be able to construct a realistic subquantum model or
not. For the present state of development of quantum theory, this is the most reasonable
position, cf. with Zeilinger’s strong anti-realist attitude. Moreover, just recently (through
a series of email exchanges) I understood better the position of C. Fuchs on the problem
of non/realism. Surprisingly QBists (at least C. Fuchs) do not consider QBism as a non-
realist interpretation of QM.
5We remark that in coming considerations the interpretation of probabilities does not
play any role. They can be subjective probabilities (as originally in QBism), but they also
can be statistical, e.g., Kolmogorovian or Misesian, as well.
6As was remarked, probability can be interpreted in other ways. The situation is similar
to the classical probability update. De Finetti would treat this probability as subjective,
but Kolmogorov, or Gnedenko, or von Mises as statistical.
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QBists assume that the agent’s reference measurement is an arbitrary
informationally complete POVM, E = (Ei), such that each Ei is of rank
1, i.e., is proportional to a one-dimensional projector. Such measurements
exist for any finite Hilbert-space dimension. Furthermore, we assume that, if
the agent carries out the measurement E = (Ei) for an initial state ρ, upon
getting outcome Ei he would update to the post-measurement state
ρi =
EiρEi
TrEiρEi
.
This is the assumption of atomicity of this quantum instrument. (This is
a strong constraint on the class of instruments which are used in QBism.
It would be interesting to analyze the possibility to proceed with arbitrary
instruments.)
Because the reference measurement is informationally complete, any state
ρ corresponds to a unique vector of probabilities
p(Ei) = TrEiρ,
and any POVM F = (Fj) corresponds to a unique matrix of conditional
probabilities
p(Fj|Ei) = tr(Fjρi).
The operators ρ and Fj on the right-hand side of the Born rule are thus math-
ematically equivalent to sets of probabilities p(Ei) and conditional probabil-
ities p(Fj |Ei). (We remark that all these probabilities depend on the state ρ,
i.e., p(Ei) ≡ pρ(Ei), p(Fj) ≡ pρ(Fj), p(Fj|Ei) = pρ(Fj|Ei)).
Then Fuchs and Schack [21]-[23] stress that POVMs as well as quantum
states represent an agent’s personal degrees of belief. However, this is not
essential for the formal scheme of probability update. We can as well interpret
the probabilities p(Ei) and p(Fj|Ei) statistically. The main point which was
rightly emphasized by them is that the Born rule can be interpreted as one
special form of transformation of probabilities:
p(Fj) = f(p(Ei), p(Fj|Ei)). (2)
Comparing with the classical FTP which is in these notations written as
p(Fj) =
∑
i
p(Ei)p(Fj|Ei) (3)
they formulate the statement which I consider as the cornerstone of QBism:
The Born rule is one of the forms of generalization of FTP.
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For me, the main problem of QBists is that they started with a SIC-
POVM E = (Ei). They say [21]: “The Born rule allows the agent to calculate
her outcome probabilities p(Fj) in terms of her probabilities p(Ei) and p(Fj |E.i)
defined with respect to a counterfactual reference measurement.” This reference
to counterfactuals is really redundant. Why should SIC-POVM measurement
appear at all? As in the Va¨xjo¨ approach, one can start with an arbitrary
POVM-measurement, say G = (Gi), to define probabilities p(Gi) = TrρGi
providing information about the state ρ.
By taking into account such a possibility of generalization of QBist con-
sideration7 I completely agree with the following statement of QBism [21]:
“In QBism, the Born rule functions as a coherence requirement. Rather than
setting the probabilities p(Fj), the Born rules relates them to those defining the
state ρ and the POVM F = (Fj). Just like the standard rules of probability theory,
the Born rule is normative: the agent ought to assign probabilities that satisfy the
constraints imposed by the Born rule.”
The functional relationship given by (2) depends on details of the ref-
erence measurement. In the special case that the reference measurement is
a symmetric informationally complete POVM (SIC) , (2) takes the simple
form:
p(Fj) = TrFjρi =
∑
i
(
(d + 1)p(Ei)−
1
d
)
p(Fj|Ei). (4)
This is a consequence of the complete information representation of a quan-
tum state and the use of SIC-POVMs, see appendix.
QBists have conjectured that this form of the Born rule may be used as an
axiom in a derivation of quantum theory. The key question that remains is
in identifying what minimal further principles must be added to the equation
(4) for the project to be successful.
Remark. This program is identical to attempts to justify the Va¨xjo¨
interpretation by deriving the complex Hilbert space formalism from the
generalized FTP with an interference term [30], [37], [38]. However, I tried
to derive the complex Hilbert space structure of QM solely from the latter
generalization of FTP, i.e., without additional axioms. This approach was
successful only for dichotomous observables. Already the case of three-valued
observables is very difficult mathematically. Here only a partial succes was
achieved by P. Nyman and I. Basieva [45], [46]. May be Fuchs and Schack are
7However, for QBists the above generalization - to start the probability update scheme
with an arbitrary POVM measurement G = (Gj) and not with a SIC-POVM E = (Ei) -
seems to be unacceptable. They are really addicted on SIC-POVMs and on completeness
of information gained at the first step, information about the state, even at the price of
appearance of counterfactuals.
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right that one has to find additional axioms leading to the complete deriva-
tion of the quantum formalism, as, e.g., was done by D’ Ariano et al. [14],
[15], [12], [13]. However, proceeding with such additional axioms does not
match completely the basic principle that the quantum formalism is just a
special form of the probability update generalizing the classical Bayesian up-
date. This principle is very attractive in both QBism and the Va¨xjo¨ interpre-
tation (though they have different mathematical realizations). Completing
a generalized probability update scheme by additional operational principles
diminishes the value of this scheme as the unique fundamental principle lying
in the ground of QM. It shifts the line of research to more traditional opera-
tional approaches starting with the pioneer contribution of Heisenberg [26],
then Mackey [44] and nowadays D’ Ariano et al. [14], [15], [12], [13]. In this
paper we do not plan to analyze the operational axiomatics of D’Ariano et
al.. However, in previous derivations of QM from “natural operational prin-
ciples” complex Hilber space was always encrypted, practically explicitly, in
one of the axioms, see, e.g., G. Mackey [44] for one of the first operational
derivation of the quantum formalism. There is still some hope that at least
the Va¨xjo¨ scheme of the probability update, for the FTP with the interfer-
ence term [30], [37], [38]. may lead to derivation of the complete formalism.
The difficulties which stopped my further studies in this direction were of
the mathematical origin – too complicated mathematical calculations.
5 Agents constrained by Born’s rule
In 2001 the private user’s experience viewpoint on quantum physics made
me really mad and this was the main reason for my anti-QBism attitude [33]
(see Appendix A).8 However, recently I understood that the situation may
be not so bad as one can imagine by reading the QBism manifests, such as
presented in section 3. May be this long way to understanding is not only
my fault. QBists judge too highly the private user interpretation of QM
comparing with the problem of concretization of the class of such private
users. I remember that in 2001 in Va¨xjo¨ I asked C. Fuchs: “Suppose that
your user, Ivan, lives in taiga by hunting and he has never heard about QM.
Would Ivan make proper predictions about simplest quantum experiments?”
I do not remember the precise answer of C. Fuchs, but it seems it was a
8The strong anti-Copenhagen attitude in the first declaration about the Va¨xjo¨ inter-
pretation was partially a consequence of the active advertising of QBism at Va¨xjo¨-2001
conference. My reaction (as many others) was: “See, the Copenhagen interpretation fi-
nally led to such a perverse view on QM as the private agent’s perspective on the quantum
state.”
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long story about his version of FTP (4), which was considered by me as
totally irrelevant to my question. Then I asked C. Fuchs the same question
during a few next Va¨xjo¨ conferences and I did not get a satisfactory answer
(at least from my viewpoint). Recently, during the Va¨xjo¨-2015 conference,
where QBism was heavily represented by the talks of its founders, I got a new
possibility to discuss its foundations with C. Fuchs and in the after-conference
email correspondence I finally got a clear answer to my old question. Of
course, this answer could be found in the works of Fuchs and Schack, but it
was dimmed by the very strong emphasize of the private agent perspective.
So, if I understood C. Fuchs correctly, the class of agents has to be con-
strained! And the basic constraint is given by the Born rule which is treated
as an empirical rule reflecting some basic features of nature, see section 4
for discussion. For a moment, for us the concrete natural basis of the Born
rule is not important. It is important that QBism uses this rule as an infor-
mation constraint to determine a class of so to say “quantum agents”, i.e.,
those who “get tickets to the QBism performance.” Thus private users of
QM are those who know the main rule of the game: the probability update
for quantum systems has to be done with the aid of the Born rule (or QBist
version of FTP, see (4)). It seems reasonable that such agents would pro-
duce reasonable predictions. Thus Ivan form taiga is excluded from QBist
agents – finally!
The Born rule constraint is the basic necessary condition for entrance to
the QBism club. At the same time it is practically a sufficient conditions,
because other personal characteristics of an agent making predictions about
quantum experiments play subsidiary roles in relation to these predictions.
Thus in principle one may invent an abstract (conceptual) QBism-agent who
makes her probabilistic predictions about experiment results on the basis of
the Born rule. In this way QBism comes closely to the recent version of
the information interpretation of QM of Zeilinger-Brukner proposed by C.
Brukner [9]. However, while QBistd would, in principle, accept an interpre-
tation a la Brukner, i.e., referred to a conceptual agent, they definitely would
not like to diminish the role of private agent perspective in QBism.
Finally, I point to coupling of QBism with recently flowering applications
of the probabilistic formalism of quantum mechanics outside of physics, see,
e.g., [39]. C. Fuchs and R. Schack declared [23]: “According to QBism, quan-
tum mechanics can be applied to any physical system. QBism treats all physical
systems in the same way, including atoms, beam splitters, Stern-Gerlach mag-
nets,...” If so, then why only “to any physical system”? Why not to any
system, biological, cognitive, social, political? From my viewpoint, QBism is
an excellent interpretation to motivate extension of the domain of applica-
tions of the quantum formalism.
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However, it seems that, for a QBist, it is difficult (if possible at all)
to accept the possibility of such wider use. The reaction of C. Fuchs to
my comments in this direction cannot be characterized as excitement. Of
course, this calm reaction might have social roots. By assuming that QBism
is a theory about generalized probability update done not only in physics,
but, in fact, everywhere, QBists would depart even farther from the main
stream physics.
However, it might be that distancing from applications outside of physics
has fundamental grounds. In contrast to the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation, in QBism
the Born rule is not just a consequence of a very general scheme of the
probability update. Its appearance in quantum physics is a consequence of
some fundamental feature of nature, namely, a kind of intrinsic quantum
randomness. Thus by extending the domain of applications of the quantum
formalism to cover, e.g., cognition, one has to assign to cognition a kind of
intrinsic quantum(-like) randomness. In principle, one cannot exclude that
not only quantum physical systems, but even bio-systems are intrinsically
random. However, this is a very complicated problem. It seems that QBists
(busy with their own problems in physics) simply do not like to be involved
in the problem of justification of intrinsic bio-randomness.
6 QBism challenge: Born rule or Hilbert space
formalism?
This section is based on the output of my discussions with A. Plotnitsky on
the QBists emphasis of the role of the Born rule in QM and their attempts
to derive it from the generalized scheme for probability update based on the
QBist-FTP (4).
In QBism the Born rule is esteemed very high. It is important to point out
that this rule is just a component of the complex Hilbert space representation
of states of quantum systems (independently of their interpretation), i.e., it
is just a part of the mathematical model serving QM. If the complex Hilbert
space representation is established (derived or postulated), then Born’s rule
appears practically automatically:
The wave function cannot be used directly to predict probabilities, because
it is a complex vector in a Hilbert space, and you need a real number to get to
probabilities, for which the conjugation is the easiest way, which is the Born
rule.
Heisenberg already de facto used it for the special case of the probabilities
for elections emitting photon in the hydrogen atom. Dirac and von Neumann,
11
of course, used in connection with the projection postulate. Hence, given the
Hilbert space representation of states, the Born rule is its trivial consequence.
In QBism the Born rule is interpreted as an empirical rule. However,
the Born rule is not simply a feature of nature, but rather, along with the
mathematical model itself9, the rule responds to something that is in nature
and in our interactions with nature, which is, in a way, also part of nature,
insofar as we are part of nature. It is also important to remark that the Born
rule is added to the Hilbert space formalism and not derived from it, but
both are always used together for any prediction.
We also remark that, in contrast to QBism, the Va¨xjo¨ approach can be
characterized as an attempt to derive the Hilbert space representation of
probabilities with aid of complex probability amplitudes (wave functions),
not just the Born rule in, e.g., SIC-POVM form. This assigns a higher value
to the wave function Hilbert space representation than in QBism. This is a
special case of the mathematical modeling approach to study of natural (and
mental) phenomena, again cf. with Va¨xjo¨ interpretation..
This question can be considered from even more general point: even if
we have a different mathematical model, somehow without amplitudes (wave
functions), but still with some Born or Born-like rule (for example, because
the SIC-POVM formalism is still complex-number based), the agent’s com-
mitment to this rule will necessarily cover the mathematical model, too.
Arguably, it will be to the model in the first place, because the rule applies
in the framework of the model and is meaningless without it. For example,
one needs to be committed to the mathematics which defines SIC-POVMs,
if only in a trivial sense of manipulating the formal symbols involved. On
the other hand, we need such a rule to make predictions in cases like QM.
In classical mechanics, or relativity, the formalism is descriptive and pre-
dictions follow from this description, so the rule is contained in the formalism.
May be QBism current program is to embed the rule in the mathematical
model somehow, but it is not clear whether this is possible, as the QBism-
formalism is clearly not descriptive.
That is not only the question of adding probability calculation (the rule
for how amplitudes change), but how to get to probability in the first place.
It was not easy even in classical statistical physics, and it took the likes of
Boltzmann, Maxwell, Planck, and Gibbs, to establish these rules.
9They always work together forming a coherent set of constraints upon effective pre-
dictions, as the Born rule is just as meaningless apart from the mathematical model as the
use of the mathematical formalism cannot predict the outcomes of measurements without
Born’s rule, see footnote 22 [51]
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7 Is QBism a version of the Copenhagen in-
terpretation?
By following the talks of C. Fuchs or R. Schack I always had the feeling that
their views are very much in the spirit of Copenhagen. Bohr and Heisenberg
always pointed out that the quantum formalism is not about the “quantum
physical world”, but it is a representation (mathematical) of measurements
performed on micro-systems. Thus, from their viewpoint QM is about knowl-
edge (especially for Heisenberg). Do Fuchs and his coauthors, Schack, Mer-
min, Caves, try to say the same thing by just using the special interpretation
of probability, the subjective probability? I still do not have my own definite
opinion about this issue. Therefore here I present a long citation of D. Mer-
min who knows QBism much better than me and who claims that QBism
differs crucially from all interpretations in the spirit of Copenhagen, see [?],
p. 7-8:
“A fundamental difference between QBism and any flavor of Copenhagen, is
that QBism explicitly introduces each user of quantum mechanics into the story,
together with the world external to that user. Since every user is different, divid-
ing the world differently into external and internal, every application of quantum
mechanics to the world must ultimately refer, if only implicitly, to a particular
user. But every version of Copenhagen takes a view of the world that makes no
reference to the particular user who is trying to make sense of that world.
Fuchs and Schack prefer the term “agent” to “user”. “Agent” serves to em-
phasize that the user takes actions on her world and experiences the consequences
of her actions. I prefer the term user to emphasize Fuchs’ and Schack’s equally
important point that science is a user’s manual. Its purpose is to help each of us
make sense of our private experience induced in us by the world outside of us.
It is crucial to note from the beginning that “user” does not mean a generic
body of users. It means a particular individual person, who is making use of
science to bring coherence to her own private perceptions. I can be a “user”. You
can be a “user”. But we are not jointly a user, because my internal personal
experience is inaccessible to you except insofar as I attempt to represent it to you
verbally, and vice-versa. Science is about the interface between the experience of
any particular person and the subset of the world that is external to that particular
user. This is unlike anything in any version of Copenhagen. It is central to the
QBist understanding of science.”
Of course, the reader can find this Mermin’s viewpoint on QBism as pri-
vate agent (user) business does not match completely the conclusion from
my discussion on the class of users belonging to the “QBism club” and con-
strainted by the knowledge about the Born rule, see section 5. This is a
consequence of the private user’s perspective to interpreting QBism – both
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David Mermin and I are good friends of the founder of QBism, Christo-
pher Fuchs, and we both got our information about QBism directly from its
founder....
8 Kolmogorov’s Interpretation of Probability
Kolmogorov proposed [41, 42, 43] to interpret probability as follows: “[. .
. ] we may assume that to an event A which may or may not occur under
conditions Σ, [there] is assigned a real number P (A) which has the following
characteristics:
• (a) one can be practically certain that if the complex of conditions
Σ is repeated a large number of times, N, then if n be the number
of occurrences of event A, the ratio n/N will differ very slightly from
P (A);
• (b) if P (A) is very small, one can be practically certain that when
conditions Σ are realized only once the event A would not occur.”
The (a)-part of this interpretation is nothing else than the frequency
interpretation of probability, cf. with von Mises theory and his principle of
the statistical stabilization of relative frequencies [56, 57, 58]. In the measure-
theoretic approach this viewpoint on probability is justified by the law of
large numbers. However, for Kolmogorov, approximation of probability by
frequencies was not the only characteristic feature of probability. The (b)-
part (known in foundations of probability as Cournot’s principle, section 9,
also plays an important role. This is the purely weight-type argument: if
the weight assigned to an event is very small than one can expect that such
an event would never happen. We emphasize that Kolmogorov presented
this weight-type argument in its strongest form - “never happen”. One may
proceed with a weaker form - “practically never happen”, cf. section 9: weak
and strong forms of the Cournot’s principle.
9 Cournot’s Principle
We continue to discuss Kolmogorov’s interpretation, section 8. Its (b)-part is
also known as Cournot’s principle. (In the presentation of this principle and
historical circumstances of its appearance we follow the works of G. Shafer,
see, e.g., [54].) Its first version is due to J. Bernoulli (1713) who related
mathematical probability to moral certainty/impossibility:
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“Something is morally certain if its probability is so close to certainty that the
shortfall is imperceptible.”
“Something is morally impossible if its probability is no more than the amount
by which moral certainty falls short of complete certainty.”
By setting the level of moral certainty (or impossibility) Bernoulli con-
nected mathematical probability with the real world:
“Because it is only rarely possible to obtain full certainty, necessity and cus-
tom demand that what is merely morally certain be taken as certain. It would
therefore be useful if fixed limits were set for moral certainty by the authority of
the magistracy—if it were determined, that is to say, whether 99/100 certainty is
sufficient or 999/1000 is required. . . ”
In other words, an event with a small probability will not happen! A.
Cournot (1843) stated that this principle of impossibility is the only way to
connect mathematical probability with the real world (the name Cournot’s
principle was proposed by M. Fre`chet). A. Cournot used this principle to
justify the frequency interpretation of probability. At that time he already
could refer the Bernoulli-Poisson version of the law of large numbers with
probability convergence. By using this principle he concluded that the event
“the limit of the arithmetic averages would differ from the probability aver-
age” would never happen, since its probability is very small.
This was an important logical step in foundations of probability theory.
In 18th-19th centuries, probabilists were not yet able to prove the strong
law of large numbers, However, they as well as statisticians and physicists
badly wanted to apply the frequency interpretation of probability. The use
of Carnot’s principle with combination of the weak law of large numbers
“solved” this problem.
Cournot discussed not only moral impossibility (very small probability),
but also physical impossibility (infinitely small probability):
“A physically impossible event is one whose probability is infinitely small.”
In spite of the remark, section 8, that there is a subjective element in
the (b)-part of Kolmogorov’s interpretation (and Cournot’s principle) - set-
ting the level of moral impossibility, those who used this principle treated
probability objectively. Subjectivists, as de Finetti, rejected it.
Cournot’s principle principle played an important role in creation of ob-
jective interpretation of probability. At the beginning of 20th century it
was supported by the majority of leading probabilists, e.g., by Hadamar,
Le`vy, Borel, Kolmogorov, Fre`chet. Fre`chet distinguished between the weak
and strong forms of Cournot’s principle. The weak form says an event of
small probability seldom happens. (Fre`chet, Cramer). The strong form says
an event of small probability will not happen (Cournot, Hadamard, Le`vy,
Kolmogorov, Borel). As well as von Mises, Fre`chet and Le`vy agreed that
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Cournot’s principle leads to an objective concept of probability: Probability
is a physical property just like length and weight.
However, in late 1950s and 1960s Cournot’s principle practically disap-
peared from the probability scene. There were a few reasons for this. First of
all, Kolmogorov after publication of his fundamental book on axiomatics of
probability theory did not discuss the interpretational issues so much (may
be not all). As was already pointed out, his model of probability started to be
used “interpretationally free” - probability is just a measure. Another reason
was strong attacks of subjectivists to the objective viewpoint on probability,
especially de Finetti’s critique. Moreover, as we have seen in Kolmogorov’s
interpretation, Cournot’s principle is supplementary to the first part of this
interpretation which is purely frequentist. And frequentists, as von Mises
[56, 57, 58], tried to proceed just using the (a)-part of Kolmogorov’s interpre-
tation. They neither support Cournot’s principle. Finally, after Kolmogorov
proved the strong version of the law of large numbers, one need not more
use this principle as a supplement to the weak version of this law (Bernoulli-
Poisson-Khinchin). At the same time Kolmogorov by himself still explored
Cournot’s principle as the second part of his interpretation of probability and
it was after he proved Theorem 5 [?]. And moreover the strong law of large
numbers was presented in his monograph [41].10
By the 1970s, only Prokhorov (a former student of Kolmogorov) carries
Kolmogorov’s fame, expressing the principle in very special form: only prob-
abilities close to zero or one are meaningful. (If fact, as student of Moscow
state university, I heard this interpretational statement, but I treated it as
total nonsense. For me probability was a measure and nothing more).
10So, it seems a lot of historicity and psychology was involved in creation of Kolmogorov’s
theory of probability. I remark that in general his foundational monograph makes the
impression that it was written “per one time”, without deep reflections. It really might
be the case. Kolmogorov never put his work on creation of the modern axiomatics of
probability theory to the top of his scientific achievements. In private conversations he
prioritized the contribution to theory of dynamical systems. He also told (again private
communications) that at that time the idea about the measure-theoretic formalization of
probability “was in the air”. May be the latter is correct, but at the same time if we
compare his work with works of his main competitors, say von Mises, Borel, Bernstein,
Fre`chet, we would be surprised by clearness and shortness of Kolmogorov’s formalization
comparing with longly and darkly writings of others. For example, I heard many times
from top Soviet probabilists about Bernstein’s axiomatization of probability, preceding
Kolmogorov’s axiomatization. Recently I read Bernstein’s book [2]. It is a real mess...
Bernstein tried to make a step towards an abstract presentation of probability theory,
but his work heavily suffered of longly algebraic concretizations. Thus after its reading I
appreciated Kolmogorov’s contribution to foundations of classical probability theory even
more.
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10 Subjective Interpretation of Probability
There are two basic mathematical models of probability, von Mises’ frequency
model [56, 57, 58] and Kolmogorov’s measure-theoretic model [41, 42, 43].
Nowadays the first one is practically forgotten and the second one is widely
used in engineering, telecommunications, statistical physics, chemistry, biol-
ogy, psychology, social science. However, the von Mises approach played the
crucial role in development of theory of individual random sequences - ran-
domness as unpredictability (impossibility of a successful gambling system),
although at the final stage of the mathematical formalization of random-
ness it was suppressed by two other approaches - randomness as complexity
(Kolmogorov) and as typicality (Martin-Lo¨f).
Each scientific theory consists of the two parts, a mathematical model
and an interpretation of the mathematical entities. Both models (of von
Mises and Kolmogorov) are endowed with the statistical interpretation of
probability : if the same complex of experimental conditions (experimen-
tal context) is repeated a large number of times than the frequencies of
outcomes approach the corresponding probabilities. One of the differences
between the approaches of von Mises and Kolmogorov is that, for the first
one the statistical interpretation is the essence of probability, but for the
second one probability is initially defined as a measure and then one has to
prove a theorem, the strong law of large numbers, to motivate the frequency
interpretation. We remark that the definition of probability as a measure
is heuristically equivalent to assigning weights to elementary events. Thus
Kolmogorov’s definition of probability is (again heuristically) based on the
procedure of weighting of events. (Here Kolmogorov generalized Laplace’s
definition of probability which was based on assigning of equal weights to all
elementary events.) However, Kolmogorov did not want to use this weight-
like measure-theoretic definition of probability as its interpretation, with the
aid of the law of large numbers he moved to the frequency interpretation
coinciding with von Mises’ “genuine frequency interpretation”:
• (a) “one can be practically certain that if the complex of conditions Σ is
repeated a large number of times, N, then if n be the number of occurrences
of event A, the ratio n/N will differ very slightly from P (A);”
We remark that in the process of creation of his measure-theoretic axiomat-
ics of probability theory Kolmogorov was strongly influenced by von Mises,
see [41] and also [30], [37]. Therefore it might be that the frequency in-
terpretation was also motivated by von Mises theory. The main argument
against using the weight-interpretation is that it loses its heuristic attraction
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for continuous sample spaces such as Ω = [a, b],Ω = R,Ω = C([a, b]) (the
space of continuous functions on [a, b] which is endowed with, e.g., Winer
measure). Here, for non-discrete probability measure, the weight of each sin-
gle elementary event is zero and it is impossible to jump from zero probability
of elementary events to non-zero probability of a non-elementary event.
In any event the weight-like viewpoint to probability did not disappear
completely from the Kolmogorov interpretation of probability and its trace
can be found in the following statement (known as Cournot’s principle, sec-
tion 9):
• (b) “if P (A) is very small, one can be practically certain that when condi-
tions Σ are realized only once the event A would not occur.”
This (b)-part of Kolmogorov’s interpretation of probability is totally for-
eign to von Mises’ genuine frequency ideology.
Now we make a point: in a scientific theory the same mathematical model
can have a variety of interpretations. In particular, it happened with Kol-
mogorov’s measure theoretic-model of probability. Besides of the commonly
used statistical interpretation, probability measures can also be interpreted
in the framework of subjective probability theory.
This interpretation was used by T. Bayes as the basis of his theory of prob-
ability inference, see then Ramsey [52], de Finetti [17], Savage [53], Bernardo
and Smith [1] . Here the probability P (A) represents an agent’s personal,
subjective degrees of belief in non/occurrence of the event A. In contrast to
the statistically interpreted probability which is objective by its nature the
subjective probability is by definition not objective, so to say, “it does not
exist in nature” independently of an agent assigning probabilities to events.
This viewpoint on probability is in the direct conflict with von Mises’ viewing
of probability theory as a theory of natural phenomena, similar to, e.g., hy-
drodynamics. Kolmogorov and the majority of Soviet probabilists also took
the active anti-subjectivist position. Although Kolmogorov treated probabil-
ity theory as a mathematical theory (so his viewpoint on probability theory
did not coincide with Mises’ viewpoint), he also interpreted it as representing
objective feature of repeatable phenomena, statistical stability of them.
At the same time, since the measure-theoretic definition of Kolmogorov
probability is heuristically based on the weighting-like procedure for events,
it seems that the subjective interpretation matches well the mathematical
framework of Kolmogorov probability spaces. Instead of assigning to events
objective weights (as Kolmogorov proposed to do), subjectivists assign to
events personal weights, each agent assigns to an event A his own degree
of belief. This personalization of probability contradicts not only to the
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views of von Mises, Kolmogorov and all their followers, but even the basic
methodology of modern science. And, for example, de Finetti understood
this well and emphasized this in his exciting and provocative essay [16]. He
started with a citation of the important science methodological statements of
Tilgher, see [16], p.169 (in all following citations the italic font was inserted
by me):
“Truth no longer lies in an imaginary equation of the spirit with what is outside
it, and which, being outside it, could not possibly touch it and be apprehended;
truth is in the very act of the thinking thought. The absolute is not outside our
knowledge, to be sought in a realm of darkness and mystery; it is in our knowledge
itself. Thought is not a mirror in which a reality external to us is faithfully reflected;
it is simply a biological function, a means of orientation in life, of preserving and
enriching it, of enabling and facilitating action, of taking account of reality and
dominating it.”
This viewpoint, thought is just a biological function and not reflection of
the objective features of external reality, was shared by de Finetti and used
by him to question the conventional ideology of modern science [16], p. 169:
“For those who share this point of view, which is also mine, but which I could
not have framed better than with these incisive sentences of Tilgher’s [..], what
value can science have? In what spirit can we approach it? Certainly, we cannot
accept determinism; we cannot accept the “existence”, in that famous alleged
realm of darkness and mystery, of immutable and necessary “laws” which rule
the universe, and we cannot accept it as true simply because, in the light of our
logic, it lacks all meaning. Naturally, then, science, understood as the discoverer of
absolute truths, remains idle for lack of absolute truths. But this doesn’t lead to the
destruction of science; it only leads to a different conception of science. Nor does
it lead to a “devaluation of science”: there is no common unit of measurement
for such disparate conceptions. Once the cold marble idol has fallen in pieces,
the idol of perfect, eternal and universal science that we can only keep trying to
know better, we see in its place, beside us, a living creature, the science which our
thought freely creates. A living creature: flesh of our flesh, fruit of our torment,
companion in our struggle and guide to the conquest.
Nature will not appear to it as a monstrous and incorrigibly exact clockwork
mechanism where everything that happens is what must happen because it could
not but happen, and where all is foreseeable if one knows how the mechanism
works. To a living science nature will not be dead, but alive; and it will be like
a friend about whom one can learn in sweet intimacy how to penetrate the soul
and spirit, to know the tastes and inclinations, and to understand the character,
impulses and abandonments. So no science will permit us say: this fact will come
about, it will be thus and so because it follows from a certain law, and that law is
an absolute truth. Still less will it lead us to conclude skeptically: the absolute
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truth does not exist, and so this fact might or might not come about, it may go
like this or in a totally different way, I know nothing about it. What we can say is
this: I foresee that such a fact will come about, and that it will happen in such a
way, because past experience and its scientific elaboration by human thought make
this forecast seem reasonable to me.
Here the essential difference lies in what the “why” applies to: I do not
look for why THE FACT that I foresee will come about, but why I DO
foresee that the fact will come about. It is no longer the facts that need
causes; it is our thought that finds it convenient to imagine causal relations
to explain, connect and foresee the facts. Only thus can science legitimate
itself in the face of the obvious objection that our spirit can only think its
thoughts, can only conceive its conceptions, can only reason its reasoning,
and cannot encompass anything outside itself.”
This statement contains such charge of energy that even one treating
probability objectively cannot reject it without deep analysis. Of course,
primarily de Finetti is right that in scientific prediction “I foresee that such
a fact will come about, and that it will happen in such a way, because past
experience and its scientific elaboration by human thought make this fore-
cast seem reasonable to me.” We have only our thought and even existence
of objective reality is just one of its fruits. 11 For me the essential differ-
ence lies in the interpretations of “human thought”: either as personalized
or as collective. In the above citation from de Finetti, it seems that “human
thought” has the meaning of thought of a kind of the universal agent do-
ing scientific research. (The same can be said about “human experience” in
Chopra’s statement, see the previous footnote). If we take subjective proba-
bility as the degree of belief of such a universal agent, then the dispute about
objectivity or subjectivity of probability would be resolved peacefully. If de
Finetti were not assumed the existence of objective reality ruled by natural
laws, but just assumed the use of the scientific experience of the mankind,
represented as the universal thinking agent, then von Mises or at least Kol-
mogorov might agree that such kind of subjective probability has the right
for existence. This my playing with the universal agent perspective on the
subjective probability can be compared with Gnedenko’s statement, section
11I cannot miss the possibility to cite here also Deepak Chopra - controversial New-Age
guru (his email from November 3, 2015) : “Scientific theories are made in consciousness,
experiments are designed in consciousness, observations are made in consciousness , There
is no science without consciousness. Consciousness created science. We objectify our
human experience in consciousness and called that reality! There is no reality without
consciousness. Atoms and molecules are words invented by humans for experiences in
consciousness. Using experiences to explain experiences is tautology. Scientists need more
humility and less hubris.”
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??: “Subjective probabilities, if necessary, can be made objective.”
However, (and this the main point) de Finetti strongly supports the per-
sonal viewpoint on subjective probability and, hence, “human thought” and,
“past experience and its scientific elaboration”.12
This personal agent viewpoint is unsympathetic for the majority of scien-
tists, especially those exploring natural sciences. One of the main problems
is that subjectivity of probability leads to subjectivity of cause. To illus-
trate this subjectivity of “causal relations”, de Finetti presented the following
provocative example [16], pp.179-180:
“... the essence of the idea of cause escapes me entirely: it only shows itself
when I pass from what is already known to predicting the unknown, when the
factual data affect our state of mind, when from the easy science of hindsight we
want to get a rule of action for the future. Suppose it to have been observed that
many times, after an eclipse there is a war. Why don’t I say that the eclipse is
a cause of war, and why do superstitious people believe it? And why do we call
them superstitious? In saying that the eclipse is not a cause of war I mean that, if
tomorrow I see an eclipse, the outbreak of war will not therefore seem more likely
to me than if an eclipse had not happened. One who says that the eclipse is a
cause of war would mean that for him, on the contrary, after an eclipse he would
see the threat of war as imminent. I call him superstitious because his state of
mind is different from mine and from that of the society to which I belong, because
it clashes with the conception of the world which is the innermost part of my
imagination and of the imagination of my century. But if I want to strip away the
part of my thought that is my own creation, if I want to distill from my opinions
the objective part, i.e., the part that is purely logical or purely empirical, I will
have to recognize that I have no reason to prefer my state of mind to that of a
superstitious person except that I actually feel the state of mind which is mine,
while that of a superstitious person repels me. The example I gave is an extreme
case, and it might seem paradoxical. But there are infinitely many others where it
would not surprise a contemporary if I said that I do not know how to tell whether
or not a causal relation exists; there are infinitely many cases that daily give rise
to such discussions. I expressed my opinion: the concept of cause is subjective.”
Here by rejecting the position of “eclipse causing believers” and select-
ing the position of those “from that of the society to which I belong” de Finetti
might explore the universal agent perspective. However, he treated two afore-
mentioned positions as equally acceptable.
12It is clear why. And now the reader will understand why I did cite Chopra - because
Chopra’s attempt to escape personalization of human experience led to global conscious-
ness, a kind of consciousness of universe. De Finetti definitely did not want to be in the
global consciousness club.
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The rejection of objectivity of cause by de Finetti can be compared with
rejection of causality by von Neumann in his interpretation of QM. (Causal-
ity is rejected in all versions of the Copenhagen interpretation of QM. How-
ever, its probabilistic nature was discussed most clearly in von Neumann
book [59].) However, in contrast to de Finetti, by rejecting causality von
Neumann did not reject objectivity of probability. He used the statistical in-
terpretation of probability in its genuine von Mises’ frequency version. Von
Neumann “saved” objectivity of probability in the absence of causality by
inveting the concept of irreducible quantum randomness. Bohr and Pauli also
interpreted probability statistically and, for them, it was definitely objective.
This objectivity was based on objectivity of outputs of classical measurement
devices. In contrast to von Neumann, they did not need irreducible quantum
randomness.
However, in general de Finetti’s denial of objectivity of cause had to be
sympathetic for Copenhagenists. Therefore it is surprising that in QM no-
body tried to proceed with the subjective probability interpretation. Only
recently C. Fuchs supported by R. Schack proposed to use in QM subjective
probability and personal agent’s perspective (see section 4). This interpre-
tation of QM is known as Quantum Bayesianism (QBism).
For the fathers of QM, both Copenhagenists (as Bohr, Pauli, Dirac, von
Neumann) and anti-Copenhagenists (as Einstein, De Broglie), probability
was objective and statistical. Why? Why not subjective? One of the rea-
sons for this was that all physicists learned probability starting with classical
statistical mechanics and the statistical interpretation was firmly incorpo-
rated in their mind. Some of them were able to give up even causality,
but not statistical nature of probability, However, it seems that the main
reason was that de Finetti’s views on probability and more generally on sci-
entific theory were too revolutionary even for “quantum folk”. The latter still
wanted to have solid objective ground - in classical world, the world of macro-
scopic measurement devices. But de Finetti tried to teach us that even in
this macro-world neither probability nor cause are objective, they have to be
treated subjectively, person dependent. It seems that even Copenhagenists
would not accept such a position. By following de Finetti consistently, they
should reconsider not only physics of microworld, as was done in the process
of creation of QM, but even physics of macro-world. It is interesting that
even such a brave guy, C. Fuchs, by exploring the subjective interpretation
of probability in quantum physics was not ready (yet?) to say that now
Bayesianism has to be extended to classical statistical physics and thermo-
dynamics.13
13 My personal viewpoint on the subjective interpretation of probability is sufficiently
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Appendix: Symmetric Informationally Com-
plete Quantum Measurements
We consider one special class of atomic instruments with quantum observ-
ables given by symmetric informationally complete POVMs, SIC-POVMs.
Here informational completeness means that the probabilities of observing
the various outcomes (given by Born’s rule) entirely determine any quantum
state ρ being measured. This requires d2 linearly independent operators for
the state space of the dimension d.
The simplest definition is that a SIC-POVM is determined by a system
of d2 normalized vectors (φi) (they are not orthogonal) such that
〈φi|φj〉
2 =
1
d+ 1
, i 6= j. (5)
The elements of the corresponding SIC-POVM (Ei) are subnormalized pro-
jectors Ei =
1
d
Πi, where Πi is the orthogonal projector on φi. The elements
of SIC-POVM Ei determine the corresponding quantum operations (atomic
instruments).
The characteristic property of SIC-POVMs, symmetry, is that the inner
product in the space of operators (or d × d matrices) given by the trace is
constant, i.e.,
TrEiEj = const =
1
d2(d + 1)
, i 6= j.
By using this equality it is easy to obtain the following representation of an
arbitrary density operator ρ :
ρ =
∑
i
(
(d+ 1)p(i)−
1
d
)
Πi (6)
where p(i) = TrEiρ is the probability to obtain the result i for a measurement
presented by the SIC-POVM (Ei).
complicated. As a student of the Department of Mechanics and Mathematics of Lomonosov
Moscow State University, I was lucky to have a few lectures of Kolmogorov. Then he be-
came too ill to continue, but lectures were given by his former student A. N. Shiryaev;
in any event for us “subjective probability” was the swearword. Therefore by working on
quantum foundations [30], [38] I always keep the statistical interpretation of probability.
However, recently by working in applications of quantum probability to cognition, psychol-
ogy, decision making (Chapter 9) I started to think that the subjective interpretation is
adequate for modeling of decision making process by an individual agent. Thus I support
Gendenko’s statement (section ??): “I think every method has its possibilities and
its limitations.”
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This SIC-POVM based representation of a density operator ρ plays the
crucial role in Quantum Bayesianism (QBism), cf. with the QBist version of
quantum generalization of FTP (see section 4).
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